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The Role of Dopamine in Temporal Uncertainty
Alessandro Tomassini1, Diane Ruge1, Joseph M. Galea1,2,
William Penny1, and Sven Bestmann1
Abstract
■ The temporal preparation of motor responses to external
events (temporal preparation) relies on internal representations
of the accumulated elapsed time (temporal representations)
before an event occurs and on estimates about its most likely
time of occurrence (temporal expectations). The precision
(inverse of uncertainty) of temporal preparation, however, is
limited by two sources of uncertainty. One is intrinsic to the
nervous system and scales with the length of elapsed time such
that temporal representations are least precise for longest time
durations. The other is external and arises from temporal vari-
ability of events in the outside world. The precision of temporal
expectations thus decreases if events become more variable in
time. It has long been recognized that the processing of time
durations within the range of hundreds of milliseconds (interval
timing) strongly depends on dopaminergic (DA) transmission.
The role of DA for the precision of temporal preparation in
humans, however, remains unclear. This study therefore directly
assesses the role of DA in the precision of temporal preparation
of motor responses in healthy humans. In a placebo-controlled
double-blind design using a selective D2-receptor antagonist
(sulpiride) and D1/D2 receptor antagonist (haloperidol), par-
ticipants performed a variable foreperiod reaching task, under
different conditions of internal and external temporal un-
certainty. DA blockade produced a striking impairment in the
ability of extracting temporal expectations across trials and on
the precision of temporal representations within a trial. Large
Weber fractions for interval timing, estimated by fitting subjec-
tive hazard functions, confirmed that this effect was driven by an
increased uncertainty in the way participants were experi-
encing time. This provides novel evidence that DA regulates the
precision with which we process time when preparing for an
action. ■
INTRODUCTION
The ability to anticipate the likely time of occurrence of
events (Coull & Nobre, 1998) enables temporally precise
preparation of motor responses (temporal preparation
from here on). Accurate temporal preparation requires
the internal representation of the accumulated elapsed
time before an event occurs (temporal representation;
Niemi & Näätänen, 1981). The speed of motor responses
thus depends on how well our internal representation of
time matches the time of stimulus appearance, that is,
how precise our temporal representations are. Moreover,
temporal preparation requires estimates about the most
likely time of occurrence of an event, given past experi-
ence (temporal expectation; Janssen & Shadlen, 2005).
Our responses are thus faster when these estimates are
accurate (Niemi & Näätänen, 1981).
However, two sources of uncertainty limit the preci-
sion with which temporal preparation can be deployed
(temporal precision). One is the uncertainty about the
passage of time. Previous work has shown that the sub-
jective experience of time carries a degree of uncertainty
that scales with the passage of time (scalar property of
time; Gibbon, 1977). We thus experience a distorted
version of the veridical passage of time, and it is thought
that this distortion arises from variability intrinsic to the
nervous system, which furthermore scales with the
duration of the stimulus to be represented (Beck, Ma,
Pitkow, Latham, & Pouget, 2012). This property is also
invoked to account for Weber’s law in sensory systems
(Barlow, 1964) and, for its temporal counterpart, the
scalar property of time that links the distortion of the
subjective experience of time to the duration to be esti-
mated (Buhusi & Oprisan, 2013). Consequently, longer
durations will be associated with higher internal un-
certainty about how much time has actually passed.
The other source of uncertainty is external and arises
simply from variability in the time of occurrence of events
(Beck et al., 2012).
It has long been recognized that the processing of time
durations within the range of hundreds of milliseconds
(interval timing) strongly depends on dopaminergic
(DA) transmission (Coull, Cheng, & Meck, 2011; Matell
& Meck, 2004). For example, healthy individuals show
abnormal performance in timing tasks after pharmacolog-
ical DA blockade (Lustig & Meck, 2005; Rammsayer, 1989).
Moreover, interval timing is impaired in Parkinson disease
patients who are off medication, but this impairment nor-
malizes after levodopa administration (Praamstra & Pope,
2007; Artieda, Pastor, Lacruz, & Obeso, 1992). Indirect1University College London, 2University of Birmingham
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evidence from healthy human participants (Tomasi, Wang,
Studentsova, & Volkow, 2014; Rammsayer, 1997) and
Parkinson disease patients (Smith, Harper, Gittings, &
Abernethy, 2007) suggests that a specific role for DA might
be in controlling levels of temporal precision (and thus
its inverse, temporal uncertainty). These findings side with
theoretical (Frank, 2005) and physiological (Rolls, Thorpe,
Boytim, Szabo, & Perrett, 1984) observations of an in-
creased level of neural variability after DA depletion. This
line of thought has been applied to investigate the impact
of DA imbalance on action reprogramming (Bestmann,
Ruge, Rothwell, & Galea, 2015; Friston et al., 2012; Galea,
Bestmann, Beigi, Jahanshahi, & Rothwell, 2012) and to
account for Parkinsonian symptoms (Frank, 2005). How-
ever, with regard to the precision of temporal representa-
tions and temporal expectations, and how they influence
our ability to prepare actions, the role of DA has never
been assessed.
The present work is the first to directly address this
question by comparing the impact of systemic DA block-
ade (haloperidol and sulpiride) on temporal preparation
in healthy humans. Both DA antagonists were chosen
because of their different pharmacological properties
(Galea et al., 2012). Whereas sulpiride selectively blocks
DA receptors of the D2 receptor family (O’Connor &
Brown, 1982), haloperidol blocks both D1 and D2 recep-
tor families (Zhang & Bymaster, 1999). Pharmacological
studies on rats suggest that different DA receptor families
might mediate distinct aspects of temporal preparation.
D2 signaling, particularly in the striatum, is implicated in
forming temporal expectations about stimulus occurrence
across trials (Meck, 2006). Mesocortical D1 signaling, in-
stead, is required to continually update the temporal rep-
resentations of time accumulating within a trial (Parker,
Alberico, Miller, & Narayanan, 2013).
Thus, possible differential effects of haloperidol and
sulpiride on temporal preparation could pinpoint the
role of D1 and D2 signaling in the formation of temporal
representations and temporal expectations in humans.
Specifically, a selective impact of haloperidol would pro-
vide indication for the additional relevance of D1 signal-
ing, whereas a comparable effect of both drugs on the
formation of temporal expectations would point toward
the importance of D2 signaling. Moreover, in the latter
case, a stronger impact of haloperidol would speak to a
crucial role of nigrostriatal D2 receptors, given the spe-
cific receptor affinity of haloperidol (Coull et al., 2011).
To this end, we assessed temporal preparation using a
simple variable foreperiod (FP) task. Here, the response
speed (RS = RTs−1) provides an index for the ability
to deploy temporal preparation, such that more precise
temporal preparation generates faster RS (Niemi &
Näätänen, 1981). Specifically, two robust phenomena
have been reported in variable FP experiments. First,
temporal preparation is best when FP duration can be
anticipated (Coull & Nobre, 1998; Karlin, 1959), whereas
high FP variability renders it more difficult to prepare in
anticipation of the forthcoming event (Drazin, 1961;
Klemmer, 1956). Second, within a block of trials, RSs
are slowest for the shortest FPs and decrease propor-
tionally to FP duration, a feature known as the “FP effect”
(Niemi & Näätänen, 1981; Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1969;
Klemmer, 1956). Importantly, these two effects can be
linked to the formation of temporal expectations about
stimulus occurrence across trials and to the updating of
such expectations within a trial through temporal rep-
resentations of the accumulating time. We adopted two
model-free metrics to dissect how DA might affect the
precision of temporal expectations and representations,
respectively: temporal bias and temporal sensitivity.
First, the discrepancy (temporal bias) between the
point in time when participants expect the appearance
of the stimulus (as revealed by fastest RS) and the actually
observed most likely time of appearance (i.e., the mean
of the FP distribution) indexes the precision of temporal
expectations across trials. By changing between-trial
FP variability across blocks, we manipulated external
temporal uncertainty and, thus, the degree with which
participants should be able to form precise temporal expec-
tations. The precision of temporal expectations should
thus be inversely related to the degree of external temporal
uncertainty (i.e., large biases for high external temporal
uncertainty).
Second, the steepness of the FP effect quantifies the
change in temporal preparation per unit change in FP
duration, which can be conceptualized as the precision
of temporal representations (temporal sensitivity). By
varying the blockwise mean FP duration, we manipulated
internal temporal uncertainty levels and thus the sensi-
tivity with which participants should be able to track
the passage of time. The precision of temporal repre-
sentations should thus have a negative relationship with
the degree of internal temporal uncertainty (i.e., less tem-
poral sensitivity for high internal temporal uncertainty).
Previous behavioral work has investigated both inter-
nal and external uncertainties separately (e.g., Piras &
Coull, 2011; Tsunoda & Kakei, 2011). However, in many
situations in daily life, both forms of uncertainty occur.
Our task allows for investigating how both internal and
external temporal uncertainties affect temporal prepara-
tion and how this influence in turn is controlled by DA.
In addition, we employed a model-based analysis to
estimate the contribution of DA on subjective temporal
uncertainty. The subjective hazard function incorporates
the scalar property of time and has been successfully
employed to model temporal preparation in monkeys
(Janssen & Shadlen, 2005) and humans (Tsunoda & Kakei,
2011). Specifically, it describes the time profile for the
probability of occurrence of an imperative event (see
Methods for details). The marginal and conditional proba-
bility terms of this function capture temporal expectations
across trials and temporal representations within trial,
respectively. Subjective uncertainty is captured formally
by the Weber fraction of the subjective hazard function
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(e.g., a small Weber fraction indicates low subjective
uncertainty; Janssen & Shadlen, 2005). By estimating the
Weber fraction separately for the marginal and conditional
probability, we were able to measure the subjective
uncertainty introduced by our DA manipulation with a
specific focus on D1/D2 differential effects for temporal
expectations and temporal representations.
This study thus provides novel evidence for the role of
DA in controlling the precision of temporal preparation
for motor responses in healthy humans. Our results show
that the precision of temporal preparation reduces with
increasing temporal uncertainty and that DA blockade
produces an overall slowing of RS. However, haloperidol
affected both the formation of temporal expectations
(i.e., extraction of the mean FP) across trials and the pre-
cision of the temporal representations encoding the
elapsed time within a trial. Specifically, these impair-
ments appeared under conditions of high levels of exter-
nal and internal temporal uncertainties. A fitting of the
subjective hazard function ( Janssen & Shadlen, 2005)
to the empirical RS data confirmed that these effects
were caused by an overall increase in subjective temporal
uncertainty as indicated by large estimated Weber frac-
tions. Moreover, such increase in subjective temporal
uncertainty was maximal under haloperidol. Conversely,
neither the precision nor accuracy of movements was
affected by DA depletion, indicating a dissociable influ-
ence of DA on temporal and motor functions.
METHODS
Participants
Seventeen healthy human volunteers (eight men, nine
women) aged between 23 and 37 years (mean age =
27.5 ± 3.9 years) participated in this study. They had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none of
them had a history of neurological disorder or drug
abuse. The suitability of the participants for the pharma-
cological protocol was evaluated based on review of their
clinical history by a neurologist (D. R.). All volunteers
were naive to the experimental aims, provided written
informed consent, and received monetary compensation
for their time and travel (£15 per session). Experimental
protocols conformed to the guidelines of the Declaration
of Helsinki and were approved by the research ethics
committee of University College London.
Pharmacological Protocol
The experiment was conducted in a double-blind, placebo-
controlled, crossover design. Drug administration was
randomized and counterbalanced across participants. In
every experimental session, participants were adminis-
tered by a medically trained individual (D. R.) a single oral
dose of either 2.5mg of haloperidol, 400mg of sulpiride, or
placebo (Bestmann et al., 2015; Lake & Meck, 2013; Frank
& O’Reilly, 2006; Rammsayer, 1997). The behavioral task
was performed 2 hr after drug ingestion to coincide with
the peak plasma concentration of the drugs (Korchounov
& Ziemann, 2011; Deleu, Northway, & Hanssens, 2002).
Experimental sessions were separated by at least 1 week
to allow systemic drug clearance before the next drug
intake. After completion of every session, participants re-
ported whether they thought they received an active drug
or a placebo as well as their overall levels of attention
and fatigue experienced during the experiment.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Participants made planar reaching movements with their
dominant armwhile holding the handle of a robotic manip-
ulandum (Figure 1A). They were seated leaning slightly
forward, with their forehead supported by a gel cushion.
Movements were constrained in the horizontal plane
and performed at chest height. An arm brace was used
to reduce unwanted wrist movement, whereas move-
ments of the trunk, shoulder, and elbow were not con-
strained. An LCD monitor (refresh rate = 60 Hz) was
mounted horizontally above the experimental setup. Par-
ticipants viewed the reflection of the monitor in a mirror
suspended above the manipulandum. In this way, visual
feedback was projected into the plane of movement,
and direct vision of the arm was prevented. The position
of the arm was measured by sensors placed on the handle
of the robotic manipulandum at a sampling rate of 200 Hz
and indicated in real time by an unfilled cursor (0.3 cm in
diameter) on the display. The experimental computer
(Precision T3500, quad-core 2.8 GHz, 100-GB RAM; Dell
Computer Corp., Austin, TX) processed this information
online using C++ custom-written routines. The starting
point and the target of the movement were represented
by two equally sized squares (1 cm) shown on a black
background, positioned along participants’ medial line
(between squares, distance = 6 cm).
Behavioral Task
Before each trial, participants placed the white cursor
into the center of the starting square by moving the
robotic manipulandum (see Figure 1A and B). The trial
started once the participant had maintained the cursor
within a radius of 0.3 cm from the center of the starting
square for 300 msec. After this, the target square turned
blue (warning stimulus, WS) and indicated the impend-
ing appearance of the imperative stimulus (IS; green
target square). The onset of the IS prompted participants
to respond as quickly as possible, but not at the expense
of accuracy, by moving their arm in a “shooting” fast
movement aiming at the center of the target cursor.
The arm cursor disappeared at the onset of the WS so
that the movement was performed without visual guid-
ance to discourage online movement corrections. At
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the end of the movement (defined by the distance from
the starting square larger than 3 cm and speed lower than
3.5 cm/sec), visual feedback was given in the form of a
stationary red cursor, which appeared at the location of
the movement end point and lasted for 1 sec.
Experimental Design and General Procedure
On each trial, the FP duration was randomly sampled from
a truncated Gaussian distribution (see Figure 1C and D).
In a blocked 2 × 2 factorial design, we manipulated mean
FP duration (short: 1500 msec, long: 3000 msec) and FP
variability (i.e., standard deviation; low: 100 msec, high:
600 msec). The two distributions for short FPs were trun-
cated at 500 msec, here considered as the minimum time
required for preparation (Hackley et al., 2009), and at
2500 msec (longest FP) to preserve the distribution’s
symmetry. To ensure comparable standard deviations be-
tween short and long distributions, both tails were also
truncated to the long distribution at 2000 and 4000 msec.
The variable FP duration required participants to form an
estimate of the most likely FP (the mean of the adopted
FP distribution) for a given block. Hence, such an esti-
mate would suffer from the uncertainty introduced by
increasing FP variability. In addition, longer mean FP
duration increases temporal uncertainty because timing
accuracy deteriorates proportionally to the duration of
the time interval (Gibbon, 1977). Consequently, partici-
pants should respond faster for FP durations closer to
the mean FP, whereas increasing FP variability and mean
FP duration should diminish this gain in RS.
The experiment was composed of one training session
and three experimental sessions. Each experimental ses-
sion consisted of four blocks of 110 trials each, separated
by a short rest. A training block of 60 trials was conducted
before the main experiment, and each block started
with 20 warm-up trials. Both the training block and the
warm-up trials were identical to the experimental counter-
parts, but with the FP sampled from an exponential (non-
aging) distribution with a mean of 1000 msec. Participants
could therefore practice the task without being exposed
to the changes in conditional probability over the course
of the trial (i.e., the hazard rate) in the main experiment.
The order of conditions (blocks) was balanced across
sessions and participants following a Latin square design.
Excluding training and warm-up trials, 1320 experimental
trials (3 sessions × 4 blocks × 110 experimental trials)
were collected for each participant.
Figure 1. Variable FP task and manipulation of temporal uncertainty. (A) Participants made planar reaching movements to a target square
while holding a robotic manipulandum. They viewed the reflection of the monitor in a mirror suspended above the manipulandum. In this way,
visual feedback was projected into the plane of movement, and direct vision of the arm was prevented. (B) Movement was instructed by the
color of the target square. After a WS (blue target square), the onset of the IS (green target square) after a variable FP required a fast movement to
the target square. (C) Internal and external temporal uncertainties were manipulated by changing the mean and variance of the time between
the WS and IS (FP) across blocks. In each block, FPs were drawn from a truncated Gaussian distribution, with mean μ and standard deviation σ.
(D) Four different distributions were used in a blocked factorial design: μ (short, long) × σ (low, high) corresponding to Internal temporal
uncertainty (low, high) × External temporal uncertainty (low, high).
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At completion of each session, participants assessed
their attention level, fatigue, and quality and amount of
sleep for the previous night using a 7-point Likert scale
where 1 and 7 represented the minimum and maximum
ratings, respectively (e.g., 1 = poorest quality of sleep
and 7 = highest quality of sleep).
Data Preprocessing
Movement start and end were defined as the time points
when velocity exceeded and fell below 3.5 cm/sec. RTs
were calculated as the delay between the onset of the
IS and movement onset. Trials outside the minimum–
maximum RT (100 msec < RT < 2000 msec), maximal
end-point distance (>6 cm from the distal square), or
outlier (msec, mean ± 3 SDs; Ratcliff, 1993) criteria
(4.4% total) were excluded from further analysis.
Temporal Preparation: Model-free Analyses
RS
We analyzed mean RS (1/RT; Ratcliff, 1993) as a measure
of temporal preparation. Previous work has reported
increased intraindividual variability in response latencies
associated with DA depletion (Burton, Strauss, Hultsch,
Moll, & Hunter, 2006; Reed & Franks, 1998). A general
increase in response variability should reduce RS regard-
less of the levels of temporal uncertainty introduced by
the experiment. To control for this possibility, we ana-
lyzed within-participant RS variability by calculating the
coefficient of variation (CV, ratio between the standard
deviation and the mean RS of the sample; Goldstone,
1968).
Temporal Bias and Sensitivity
Because preparation (and thus RS) increases with time
(Niemi & Näätänen, 1981), the fastest responses are
likely to occur for FPs at the end of the distribution. A
detrending procedure subtracted the best-fit linear trend
as a function of FP (see Figure 2C, left). In this way,
residual values allow for calculating the FP corresponding
to the maximum RS independently from slow changes in
temporal preparation with the passage of time (Figure 2C,
right). Specifically, the bias in temporal expectation was
quantified for each block as the difference between the
FP at which the maximum RS occurred on average and
the mean of the actually sampled FP distribution. The
smaller the bias, the better participants learned about
the average FP duration. Conversely, the slope of the
subtracted linear fit quantifies the change in temporal
preparation per unit change in FP duration (i.e., sensitiv-
ity). A robust FP effect would correspond to large positive
slopes (because RS = RT−1) and thus would indicate
faster RS for longer FP within a block.
Temporal Preparation: Model-based Analyses
Modeling Temporal Expectation: Subjective
Hazard Function
The hazard function describes the time profile for the
probability of occurrence of the IS and is defined as the
marginal probability that an IS will appear at a given
time, divided by the conditional probability that it has
not yet occurred:
H tð Þ ¼ f tð Þ
1−F tð Þ (1)
where f(t) is a probability density function with the same
mean and standard deviation of the FP distribution for a
given block and F(t) is the corresponding cumulative
density function,
F tð Þ ¼
Z t
0
f tð Þdt (2)
Marginal and conditional probabilities reflect the prob-
ability of a stimulus occurrence across trials and within
the current trial, respectively. Hence, they can be consid-
ered as models of temporal expectation and temporal
representations. However, the formulation of the hazard
function does not take into account the subjective tem-
poral uncertainty that scales with the duration of the
interval of time (Gibbon, 1977). Such uncertainty implies
that participants experience a distorted version of the
veridical FP distribution (Figure 3B). With this in mind,
we calculated the subjective hazard function (Tsunoda &
Kakei, 2011; Janssen & Shadlen, 2005) by first smoothing
the probability density function f(t) with a Gaussian distri-
bution whose standard deviation scaled with the duration
of the interval of time (Figure 3C and D). This is similar to
convolution, but it fails shift invariance as it “blurs” the later
points more than the earlier points, which reflects the
increased uncertainty for longer durations. As a result, we
obtained the distribution of “subjective” FPs.
ef tð Þ ¼ 1
ϕt
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2π
p
Z þ∞
−∞
f sð Þe
s−tð Þ2
2ϕ2 t2d sð Þ (3)
where ϕ corresponds to the Weber fraction for time esti-
mation. By substituting Equation 3 and its definite integral
in Equation 2, we obtain the subjective hazard function
eH tð Þ ¼ ef tð Þ
1−eF tð Þ (4)
The Weber fraction provides a measure for the preci-
sion of temporal preparation. For instance, small Weber
fractions correspond to steep subjective hazard functions,
whereas with larger Weber fractions, the increase in the
subjective hazard function for longer FP is more gradual
(Figure 3E). Here, we estimated two Weber fractions, one
for the marginal and one for the conditional probabilities
of the subjective hazard function. In previous work that
has employed the subjective hazard function to study
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temporal preparation (e.g., Bueti, Bahrami, Walsh, & Rees,
2010; Janssen & Shadlen, 2005), a constant time delay, τ,
was used to account for delays in the responses introduced
by temporal uncertainty (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005) so thateH τ þ tð Þ. We considered the possibility that the time delay
τ changed with DA blockade. Moreover, given empirical
evidence suggesting that two independent processes
could operate during a variable FP task (Tsunoda & Kakei,
2011; Karlin, 1959), we also treated the ef tð Þ and eF tð Þ of the
hazard function as two separate components with inde-
pendent parameters ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively.
We fitted four models each with a different set of free
parameters (M1: τ, ϕ1, and ϕ2; M2: ϕ1 and ϕ2; M3: τ and
ϕ; M4:ϕ; see also Figure 4A), and then, for themodel com-
parison, we used random effects Bayesian model selection
(Stephan, Penny, Daunizeau, Moran, & Friston, 2009) to
Figure 2. Temporal
preparation and dopamine:
model-free analysis. (A, left)
Average median RS (msec−1)
for each level of FP variability
(bottom abscissa) and FP
duration (top abscissa).
Placebo: green, sulpiride:
red, haloperidol: blue. (Right)
Changes in RS between low and
high FP variability conditions,
plotted against FP duration.
(B, left) CV of RS for each
level of FP variability (bottom
abscissa) and FP duration (top
abscissa). (Right) Changes in
RS variability between low and
high FP variability conditions,
plotted against FP duration.
(C, left) Because temporal
preparation increases with the
passage of time, the fastest
responses are likely to occur for
long FP durations. A detrending
procedure subtracted the
best-fit linear trend as a function
of FP. Because temporal
preparation is also based on
the updating of the conditional
probability of an event over the
course of time, the slope of the
fitted linear trend is a measure
of the temporal sensitivity of
such process. (Right) The
temporal distance (absolute
error) from the residuals’ peak
time (green dashed line) and
the mean FP (red dashed line)
indicate how much temporal
preparation was misaligned to
themean stimulus onset (i.e., the
temporal bias). Gray background
histogram: distribution of FPs
for an illustrative session from a
single participant. Plots present
data from a representative
participant. (D, left) Resulting
positive slopes indicate a normal
FP effect under placebo, with
RS increasing with FP duration.
(Right) Response bias and
temporal uncertainty. (Inlay)
Data collapsed across conditions.
Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
One and two asterisks indicate
significance at the p ≤ .05 and
p ≤ .01 levels, respectively.
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choose the most likely model given the observed RS data.
The resulting exceedance probability indicated the likeli-
hood of each model to be the most frequently occurring
model in the comparison set, and the mean of the poste-
rior distribution provides an estimate of the frequency with
which any model occurs in the population. Model compar-
ison showed that a model including twoWeber fractionsϕ1
and ϕ2 as free parameters (M2) had the highest exceed-
ance probability (M2 exceedance probability: placebo,
0.99; sulpiride, 1; haloperidol, 0.98) and largest mean pos-
terior (M2 mean posterior probability: placebo, 0.66; sulpir-
ide, 0.72; haloperidol, 0.6) to generate the data of any
randomly selected participant (Figure 4A). A between-
comparison (Rigoux, Stephan, Friston, & Daunizeau,
2014) confirmed that the same model best explained our
data for all treatment conditions (probability that model
frequencies differ between drugs, p < .001). Hence, from
here onward, we will only refer to this model.
Subjective Hazard Model Fitting and
Model Comparison
RSs were smoothed to assist the model fitting. A robust
lowess filter (span = 0.3) was used for reducing uncer-
tainty while preserving the overall shape of RS over time.
We fitted Equation 4 to the smoothed RS of our partici-
pants and estimated the Weber fractions ϕ1 and ϕ2 of the
model ef tð Þ and eF tð Þ, respectively. We used a least squares
regression to fit the model to the RS data. A multistart
optimization algorithm was adopted to search efficiently
for the global minimum of the regression hypersurface
(MATLAB multistart function). Start points were chosen
randomly, with a lower bound of zero to avoid negative
values. For the model comparison, sum of squared errors
was converted into log-likelihood and then used to calcu-
late Akaike information criterion scores. Such scores
were then submitted to random effects Bayesian model
selection (Stephan et al., 2009).
Reaching Movements
Kinematics
Kinematic data were analyzed off-line with custom writ-
ten MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA) routines.
For each trial, arm trajectories were computed and filtered
with a fourth-order two-way 20-Hz low-pass Butterworth
filter. All trajectories were further inspected manually.
Figure 3. Temporal preparation and subjective temporal uncertainty: the subjective hazard function. (A) The subjective hazard function formalizes
the overall probability of the appearance of a stimulus at a given time by taking into account both the marginal probability of the stimulus and
its increase in conditional probability with the passage of time. The smoothing parameter ϕ corresponds to the Weber fraction for time estimation
and provides a measure for the subjective uncertainty in experiencing time ( Janssen & Shadlen, 2005). (B) Subjective temporal uncertainty implies
that participants experience a distorted version (blue) of the actual FP distribution (black) with mean μ and standard deviation σ. Subjective
temporal uncertainty scales with the elapsed interval of time (scalar property of time) as shown by the right heavy tail of the experienced distribution.
ϕ values arbitrarily chosen for illustration purposes. (C) Subjective marginal probability that a stimulus will appear at time t. In this example,
the distributions have same μ and σ but different smoothing parameters ϕ, with the magenta indicating larger ϕ values (i.e., larger Weber fractions)
and thus higher subjective temporal uncertainty. High subjective temporal uncertainty produces a shift (i.e., a bias) in the expectation about the
most likely time of stimulus occurrence (i.e., the curve peak). (D) Subjective conditional probability that a stimulus will occur given that it has not
occurred already. High subjective temporal uncertainty reduces the slope of the conditional probability function reflecting a diminished impact of
the passage of time on forming expectations about the time of stimulus occurrence. (E) Hypothesized relationship between subjective hazard
function and RS for different levels of subjective temporal uncertainty. Higher levels of subjective temporal uncertainty reduce temporal preparation,
resulting in a shallower hazard function and slower responses (magenta).
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Trajectories and velocity profiles were aligned on their
starting points before averaging. Reaching accuracy and
precision were assessed by fitting 95% confidence ellipses
to movement end points. The semimajor and semiminor
axes and the orientation of the ellipses were computed
from the first and second principal component analyses
of the end-point scatter. From these axes, confidence
ellipses encompassing 95% of end-point population were
constructed. The position of the ellipses’ centroid with re-
spect to target position gives a measure of reaching accu-
racy, whereas its area (more precisely, its reciprocal)
provides an overall measure of precision (Revol et al.,
2003).
Statistical Analysis
Repeated-measures ANOVA (rm-ANOVA) was adopted to
assess statistical significance of our results across Medica-
tion (placebo, haloperidol, sulpiride), FP duration (short,
long), and FP variability (low, high) in a full factorial
within-participant design. Specifically, the same statistical
analysis was conducted separately for mean RS, RS vari-
ability (CV), temporal bias, and temporal sensitivity and
on kinematic parameters (peak velocities of reaching
movements, movement times, end-point accuracy and
precision).
The same approach was used to analyze Weber frac-
tions estimated from the model fitting by analyzing the
estimates for the marginal and conditional components
separately. Because we found no significant interactions
between drugs, we collapsed the FP duration and vari-
ability to assess the effects of drugs on the two compo-
nents. Hence, in this case, the rm-ANOVA had Drugs
(placebo, haloperidol, sulpiride) × Components (marginal,
conditional) as factors.
We report partial η2 (ηp
2) as a measure of main effect
size and Cohen’s dz (Cohen, 1988) for the effect size of
post hoc t test comparisons. Corrections for multiple
comparisons were performed using Bonferroni correction.
The effectiveness of the blinding protocol was assessed
with the Friedman’s test on postsession questionnaire
scores. For all analyses, the level of statistical significance
was fixed at .05. Unless stated otherwise, all data shown
represent mean ± SEM.
RESULTS
Blinding
No side effects associated with the drug administration
were reported. Questionnaire scores did not differ be-
tween sessions for the participants’ rating of attention
(1 = poor, 7 = excellent; placebo: 4.82 ± 0.38, sulpiride:
4.94 ± 0.36, haloperidol: 4.71 ± 0.21; χ2 = 1.39, df = 2,
p = .49) or fatigue (1 = low, 7 = high; placebo: 3.12 ±
0.38, sulpiride: 2.88 ± 0.32, haloperidol: 3.47 ± 0.42; χ2 =
1.12, df = 2, p = .57) as revealed by Friedman’s test.
Figure 4. Model comparison, estimated Weber fractions, and model
fits. (A) Random effects Bayesian model selection of subjective hazard
models with different free parameters. M1: variable time delay and
independent Weber fractions for the marginal and conditional
components. M2: independent Weber fractions for the marginal and
conditional components. M3: variable time delay and one shared
Weber fraction. M4: one shared Weber fraction. The bars show that the
mean posterior probability that M2 generated the data of any randomly
selected participant was the highest. (B) Weber fractions estimated
from the winning model (M2) and collapsed across external and internal
temporal uncertainties quantify the degree of subjective temporal
uncertainty. (C and D) Weber fractions separated by external and
internal temporal uncertainties. (E) Averaged RS profiles (dashed lines)
and model fits (solid lines) from the model are superimposed for
comparison. Lines are aligned with respect to the mean of the FP
distribution (i.e., Time 0 on the abscissa; placebo: green, haloperidol:
blue, sulpiride: red). Error bars and shaded areas represent ±1 SEM.
One and three asterisks indicate significance at the p ≤ .05 and
p ≤ .001 levels, respectively.
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Furthermore, only 4 of 17 (23%) participants correctly
identified the placebo session, confirming the effectiveness
of the blinding protocol.
Temporal Preparation: Model-free Analyses
Mean RS
Participants were able to perform the task without diffi-
culty as revealed by the low error rates observed for the
entire experiment (4% of total responses). We assessed
possible effects of DA on responses by splitting the error
trials into premature and late responses. Across all con-
ditions, neither the percentage of premature or late re-
sponses differed significantly between drug conditions
(Friedman’s test, premature: χ2 = 16.09, df = 11, p =
.14; late: χ2 = 17.19, df = 11, p = .1).
We then explored the effect of uncertainty on RS under
the influence of DA blockade. Figure 2 (A and B) shows
the averaged RS and variability for each drug condition
and uncertainty level. Under placebo, RSs were faster
for FP distributions with a short mean (F(1, 16) =
22.179, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.581) and low variability (F(1,
16) = 5.781, p = .029, ηp
2 = 0.265), indicating increased
temporal preparation for low internal and external un-
certainty conditions.
DA blockade resulted in a general slowing of RS (F(2,
32) = 7.046, p = .003, ηp
2 = 0.306), relative to placebo.
However, this slowing was statistically significant only
for haloperidol (t(32) = 2.449, p = .02, dz = 0.59). A
significant three-way interaction revealed that the bene-
ficial effect of low FP variability and short FP duration
on temporal preparation was influenced by the DA treat-
ment (F(2, 32) = 3.308, p = .049, ηp
2 = 0.171). Under
placebo, uncertainty significantly modulated RS (short
FP: t(32) = 3.17, p = .006, dz = 0.77; long FP: t(32) =
2.1, p = .05, dz = 0.51). By contrast, under the effect of
medication, the effect of FP variability was no longer sig-
nificant (sulpiride: short FP, t(32) = 1.97, p = .066, dz =
0.48; long FP, t(32)= 0.95, p= .352, dz=0.23; haloperidol:
short FP, t(32) = 0.45, p= .652, dz= 0.11; long FP, t(32) =
1.24, p = .223, dz = 0.3).
We also tested whether RS variability, measured as CV
(RS standard deviation/RS mean), was affected by our
drug manipulations. If the capacity to anticipate events
was altered because of an overall increase in behavioral
variability, one would expect generally more variable re-
sponses under DA blockade, regardless of FP variability.
Under placebo, RS variability increased with FP variability
(F(1, 16) = 11.312, p= .004, ηp
2 = 0.414) in that responses
were more variable when FP variability was high
(Figure 2B). This effect was reduced to nonsignificant
levels for long FPs (FP duration × FP variability: F(1, 16)
= 5.455, p = .033, ηp
2 = 0.254; post hoc: short FP, t(16)
= 4, p = .002, dz = 0.97; long FP, t(16) = 1.71, p = .12,
dz = 0.41). Importantly, RS variability was not affected by
DA intervention (F(2, 32) = 2.281, p = .119, ηp
2 = 0.125).
Although participants showed slower RS under DA block-
ade, their variability was not significantly different from
placebo (Figure 2B, right). Impaired temporal preparation
therefore cannot be accounted for by a general, unspecific
increase in behavioral variability.
Temporal Bias and Temporal Sensitivity
To better characterize the impact of our manipulations
on temporal preparation, we adopted two distinct mod-
el-free metrics: bias in temporal expectation and the
sensitivity of temporal representations. The indepen-
dence of such measures was assessed by a correlation
analysis between the size of temporal biases and tempo-
ral sensitivity (placebo: r = .21, p = .08; sulpiride: r =
.002, p = .98; haloperidol: r = .16, p = .18).
Temporal Bias
To assess whether the altered temporal preparation under
DA blockade was caused by an impaired ability to form
temporal expectations, we measured individual temporal
bias, here defined as the (absolute) temporal difference
between the peak of the RS curve and the mean of the
FP distribution (Figure 2C, right). In this metric, temporal
preparation is optimal when one’s temporal expectation is
aligned to the actual onset of the stimulus or, in other
words, when temporal biases are minimal.
Similar to mean RS, temporal bias (Figure 2D, right)
was smaller for FP distributions characterized by short
mean (F(1, 16) = 9.531, p = .007, ηp
2 = 0.373) and low
variability (F(1, 16) = 217.468, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.931). DA
blockade resulted in significantly larger temporal biases
(F(2, 32) = 4.188, p = .024, ηp
2 = 0.207; errors [mean ±
SEM]: placebo, 92.9 ± 7.5 msec; sulpiride, 116.5 ±
10.8 msec; haloperidol, 129.88 ± 7.9 msec) relative to
placebo, although only haloperidol proved statistically
significant as revealed by follow-up analysis (t(32) =
3.78, p = .008, dz = 0.92). This pattern of results points
toward an impaired ability to correctly anticipate the IS
onset when under the influence of haloperidol.
Temporal Sensitivity
Temporal preparation also changes with the changes in
conditional probability of an event over the course of
time. The slopes of the RS profiles against FP durations
(Figure 2C, left) capture the sign and the temporal sensi-
tivity of these changes. This provides a measure for the
precision of temporal representations. In this metric,
optimal temporal preparation implies a precise represen-
tation of the passage of time and thus large positive
slopes of the RS profiles.
Our analysis revealed that the temporal sensitivity of
the FP effect was indeed influenced by FP duration
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(Figure 2D, left), with significantly smaller slopes asso-
ciated to blocks with long mean FPs (F(1, 16) = 12.191,
p = .003, ηp
2 = 0.432). This pattern was inverted for FP
variability, where more variable FP blocks yielded signifi-
cantly larger slopes (F(1, 16) = 4.188, p = .021, ηp
2 =
0.289). Higher FP variability implies that more FPs are
drawn from the end of the distribution yielding faster
responses (i.e., the FP effect). At the same time, it also
indicates that the precision of temporal representations is
affected by internal uncertainty, which increases with the
duration of the FP. The slopes of the RS profiles differed
significantly across drug conditions (F(2, 32) = 6.149,
p= .005, ηp
2 = 0.278). Under placebo, participants showed
the expected FP effect as indicated by a positive slope for
all conditions (note that slope is positive because we used
RS, which is the inverse of RTs; mean ± SEM = 0.099 ±
0.011). Slopes were, on average, smaller under sulpiride
(mean ± SEM = 0.028 ± 0.035) and negative for halo-
peridol (mean ± SEM = −0.025 ± 0.035), but this effect
was significant only for haloperidol, when compared with
placebo (t(32) = 3.26, p = .014, dz = 0.79).
From a behavioral viewpoint, this effect of haloperidol
corresponded to a reversed FP effect, whereby longer FP
durations yield slower RSs. A significant three-way inter-
action indicated that the effect of DA blockade with
respect to placebo was circumscribed to long FP durations,
regardless of FP variability for haloperidol (low variability:
t(32) = 3.954, p= .003, dz = 0.96; high variability: t(32) =
2.718, p = .047, dz = 0.66), but only for high variability for
sulpiride (t(32) = 4.66, p = .001, dz = 1.13).
Hence, these results suggest that DA blockade reduces
temporal preparation by both reducing the precision of
temporal representations and temporal expectations. In
particular, under sulpiride, temporal sensitivity was re-
duced compared with placebo only for the highest levels
of internal and external uncertainties. For haloperidol,
however, the effect was maximal for high levels of inter-
nal temporal uncertainty, but there was no interaction
with external temporal uncertainty. The latter finding
may point to saturation of the detrimental effect of DA
blockade with haloperidol, such that temporal sensitivity
cannot be further affected by manipulations of external
temporal uncertainty. This interpretation is corroborated
by the subsequent model-based analyses.
Subjective Temporal Uncertainty:
Model-based Analyses
Hazard Model Fits
Precise temporal preparation is likely underpinned by
two distinct mechanisms. In a variable FP task, their sep-
arate contributions integrate to form RS profiles that re-
semble the actual hazard function of the IS. Hence, to
characterize the impact of DA blockade on these mecha-
nisms, we fitted a subjective hazard function to individual
RS data. We estimated the Weber fractions (representing
the degree of subjective temporal uncertainty) for both
the marginal and conditional components of the model.
This approach allows for separately estimating changes
induced by DA depletion on the formation of temporal
expectation across trials and the formation of temporal
representations within trial. Our model accurately cap-
tured the features of the RS profiles (Pearson’s r2 ±
SEM: placebo, .73 ± 0.029; sulpiride, .70 ± 0.049; halo-
peridol, .74 ± 0.049; Figure 4E).
Estimated Weber Fractions
In general, under placebo, the estimated mean Weber
fractions (ϕ1: marginal, ϕ2: conditional) were smaller than
those under DA treatment (ϕ1: placebo, 0.29; sulpiride,
0.41; haloperidol, 0.45; ϕ2: placebo, 0.53; sulpiride,
0.71; haloperidol, 0.88), indicating higher subjective
temporal uncertainty after DA blockade (Figure 4C and D).
More specifically, DA depletion significantly increased
the Weber fractions of both the marginal (ϕ1: F(2, 32) =
5.02, p = .013, ηp
2 = 0.239) and conditional (ϕ2: F(2, 32) =
4.99, p = .013, ηp
2 = 0.238) components of the subjective
hazard function. However, post hoc analysis showed that
only the marginal component was significantly altered by
both drugs (ϕ1: sulpiride, t(2) = 2.76, p = .021; halo-
peridol, t(2) = 2.44, p = .039; one tailed), whereas only
haloperidol impacted on the conditional component (ϕ2:
sulpiride, t(2) = 2.31, p = .052; haloperidol, t(2) = 2.73,
p = .022; one tailed) when compared with placebo.
Although the rm-ANOVA pointed to a lack of signifi-
cant influence of sulpiride on the conditional compo-
nent, the effect was quantitatively similar for both drug
conditions. We thus maintained a cautious position toward
such result, and because the rm-ANOVA did not reveal any
interaction, we collapsed the estimated values across levels
of external and internal temporal uncertainties to search
for possible selective effect of DA blockade on the two
model components.
We performed a two-way rm-ANOVA on the collapsed
values with drugs (placebo, sulpiride, haloperidol) and
Weber fractions (ϕ1 and ϕ2) as factors. The results
(Figure 4B) confirmed that, under DA blockade, Weber
fractions were significantly larger than those in the pla-
cebo condition (F(1, 16) = 11.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.408),
with the conditional component characterized by sig-
nificantly larger mean Weber fractions when compared
with the marginal component (F(1, 16) = 21.28, p <
.001, ηp
2 = 0.571). However, the rm-ANOVA failed to iden-
tify any specific effect of DA on the two components as
evidenced by the absence of interactions. Hence, the
impaired temporal preparation observed in the model-
free analysis can be explained by increased subjective
temporal uncertainty caused by DA blockade. The pharma-
cological challenge appears to impact on the subjective
temporal uncertainty levels of both the putative mecha-
nisms recruited by the variable FP task, here modeled as
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the marginal and conditional components of the subjective
hazard function.
Reaching Movement Analysis
Given the importance of nigrostriatal regions for both
movement and interval timing (Coull et al., 2011), we inves-
tigated whether DA-antagonist administration affected the
precision and accuracy of reaching movement end points,
under different conditions of temporal uncertainty.
End-point Accuracy and Kinematics
Participants reached for the target accurately and pre-
cisely as shown by the average distance of movement
end points to the target (Figure 5C; mean ± SEM: placebo,
0.329 ± 0.05 cm; sulpiride, 0.340 ± 0.06 cm; haloperidol,
0.329 ± 0.05 cm) and by the area of the fitted 95% confi-
dence interval ellipses (Figure 5D; mean ± SEM: placebo,
3.2±0.75 cm; sulpiride, 3.75±0.83 cm; haloperidol, 3.38±
0.75 cm), respectively. Neither temporal uncertainty nor
DA blockade had significant effects on reaching accuracy
(DA manipulation: p = .206, FP duration: p = .952, FP
variability: p = .611) or precision (DA manipulation: p =
.079, FP duration: p = .393, FP variability: p = .338).
Peak velocities (Figure 5E) were not significantly affected
by any of our manipulations (mean± SEM: placebo, 47.8 ±
3.76 cm/sec; sulpiride, 48.4 ± 4.06 cm/sec; haloperidol,
48.4 ± 3.89 cm/sec; DA manipulation: p = .923, FP dura-
tion: p = .584, FP variability: p = .716). Reaching move-
ments differed between FP durations (F(1, 16) = 5.029,
p = .039, ηp
2 = 0.239) in that they required, on average,
more time to reach the target when the FP duration was
long rather than short (Figure 5F; t(16) = 2.24, p = .039,
dz = 0.54). However, statistical analysis failed to detect
any significant impact of DA blockade on movement times
(mean± SEM: placebo, 469.8± 34msec; sulpiride, 469.84±
4.06 msec; haloperidol, 504.2 ± 24.96 msec; p = .336).
Therefore, we found no evidence for extrapyramidal
effects induced by our pharmacological manipulation. This
result is not surprising in consideration of the relatively
low dosage adopted for the DA antagonists combined with
the relative young age of our participants. More broadly,
this set of results indicates that the kinematics of the
Figure 5. Kinematics of reaching movements. (A) Confidence ellipses encompassing 95% of reaching end-point population averaged across
participants are shown for each level of FP variability (columns) and FP duration (rows). The colored points indicate the location of the ellipses’
centroids with SEM in the horizontal and vertical coordinates. (B) Movement velocity profiles averaged across participants. Format follows the
conventions established in A. (C and D) Mean reaching accuracy and precision measured as the distance of ellipse’s centroid from target’s center
and ellipses’ area, respectively. Neither reaching accuracy nor precision was systematically affected by our drug manipulations. (E and F) Movement
velocity profiles (averaged across participants) and mean movement times were not significantly influenced by experimental manipulations.
Error bars and shaded areas represent ±1 SEM.
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movements were similar irrespective of DA intervention
or levels of actual or subjective temporal uncertainty.
DISCUSSION
This study provides novel evidence that DA blockade in
humans impairs temporal preparation, that is, the tem-
poral precision with which movement preparation is
deployed. Specifically, we administered DA antagonists
haloperidol and sulpiride in a double-blind placebo-
controlled experiment to test for the role of DA in regu-
lating temporal precision, a crucial requirement for tem-
poral preparation of responses to forthcoming events
(Piras & Coull, 2011). A variable FP paradigm was adapted
to a reaching task to investigate temporal preparation
under different levels of external and internal temporal
uncertainties. The rationale for this approach is based on
the idea that the brain needs to deal with internal and
external sources of temporal uncertainty to allow for pre-
cise temporal preparation. Temporal preparation should
be least precise when levels of temporal uncertainty are
highest. We reasoned that, if DA influences subjective tem-
poral uncertainty through its control of temporal precision,
this effect should be further amplified under DA blockade.
In our specific case, reduced temporal precision after DA
blockade would be reflected by a stronger impact of inter-
nal and external uncertainties on temporal preparation.
We applied two different DA drugs because of their
different affinity to D1 and D2 receptor families. Whereas
sulpiride selectively blocks DA receptors of the D2 recep-
tor family (O’Connor & Brown, 1982), haloperidol blocks
both D1 and D2 receptor families (Zhang & Bymaster,
1999). Pharmacological studies in rats indicate that differ-
ent DA receptor families might mediate distinct aspects
of temporal preparation. D2 signaling, particularly in the
striatum, is implicated in forming temporal expectations
about stimulus occurrence across trials (Meck, 2006).
Mesocortical D1 signaling, by contrast, is required to up-
date temporal representations that encode the elapsed
time within a trial (Parker et al., 2013). Thus, a differential
effect of haloperidol and sulpiride on temporal preparation
would provide indication for the possible roles of D1/D2
receptor activity in regulating temporal precision. Because
forming temporal expectations across trials and temporal
representations within trials can be mapped onto the mar-
ginal and conditional components of the subjective hazard
function, we tested for selective effects of DA treatments
on the level of subjective temporal uncertainty of such
components as estimated by their Weber fractions.
DA Blockade Impairs Temporal Expectations
and Representations
Under placebo, mean RS decreased when the IS onset was
less predictable, both in conditions of high internal and
external temporal uncertainties. This indicates that high
temporal uncertainty reduces temporal preparation in an-
ticipation of an event. Previous work has reported a general
slowing of RS under DA blockade (Rammsayer, 1997).
Here, we found that the ability for temporal preparation
was impaired under haloperidol (Figure 2A). This was
not because of a general increase in behavioral variability
but of an effect on both temporal expectations (because
of large biases) and temporal representations (because of
low temporal sensitivity; Figure 2D). In particular, the de-
cline in temporal expectation was observed only when tem-
poral uncertainty was highest (Figure 2A). DA blockade
produced a general flattening of slopes of the FP effects
(Figure 2D). This indicates that, under DA blockade, tem-
poral preparation can no longer rely on accurate temporal
representations about the passage of time. This effect was
significant for sulpiride only in conditions of high internal
and external uncertainties, whereas haloperidol led to a sig-
nificant decline in temporal sensitivity for high internal un-
certainty regardless of external uncertainty.
This decline can be seen as an indication that condi-
tions of high temporal uncertainty require more tempo-
ral precision than the participants can afford under DA
blockade. Moreover, a three-way interaction suggested
a progressive reduction of temporal sensitivity between
the drugs, such that, under haloperidol, performance
started declining at lower levels of external and internal
temporal uncertainties, compared with sulpiride.
DA Blockade Impairs Temporal Preparation by
Increasing Subjective Temporal Uncertainty
The model comparison revealed that subjective hazard
functions with marginal and conditional components
characterized by independent Weber fractions best ac-
counted for the observed data (Figure 4A). This result
seems to confirm that temporal preparation might be
based on two separate mechanisms: one extracting the
probability of stimulus occurrence across trials and the
other updating such probability with the passage of time
within a trial. The estimates from the fitted subjective
hazard function revealed that the decline in temporal
precision was accompanied by increased levels of subjec-
tive temporal uncertainty, as reflected by large estimated
Weber fractions (Figure 4B–D). However, different DA
treatments did not have significantly different effects on
the Weber fractions of the marginal and conditional com-
ponents. Therefore, our fitting confirms that the effects
of DA blockade stemmed from overall increased levels
of subjective temporal uncertainty.
The similar increase in subjective temporal uncertainty in
both themarginal and conditional components of themod-
el might appear at odds with the fact that our model com-
parison pointed to an advantage in treating the two
components as independent. However, the advantage of
treating the two model components separately appears
clearly after the inspection of their Weber fractions under
placebo, with the conditional component being less precise
than its marginal counterpart (Figure 4B). In other words,
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our estimates would suggest that the selected model has
more explanatory power than the other models in the com-
parison set because it can account for such difference.
Systems Mediating Temporal Preparation
and Reaching Movements Are
Pharmacologically Dissociable
Conversely, neither temporal uncertainty nor DA blockade
affected the precision and accuracy of reachingmovements
(Figure 5). This observation is in agreement with previous
evidence showing that temporal uncertainty does not affect
the precision of reaching movements (Georgopoulos,
Kalaska, & Massey, 1981). This observation points to a dis-
sociation between processes underlying reaching move-
ments and those serving temporal preparation.
General Discussion
Previous work has also demonstrated differential effects
of haloperidol and sulpiride on temporal precision
(Rammsayer, 1997) or action reprogramming (Bestmann,
Ruge, Rothwell, & Galea, 2015). Whereas atypical neuro-
leptics such as sulpiride primarily antagonize D2 recep-
tors in the mesolimbic and mesocortical areas of the
brain (Brücke et al., 1992), typical neuroleptics such as hal-
operidol have more widespread effects on D2 receptors.
Therefore, it has been suggested (Meck, 1996; Rammsayer,
1993) that the deteriorating effect of haloperidol depends
on its potency to block D2 receptors in the BG. This idea
sides with the central role attributed to BG in interval tim-
ing (Coull et al., 2011; Matell & Meck, 2004).
Manipulations of nigrostriatal projections influence
fixed-interval timing performance (Buhusi & Meck, 2005).
Moreover, substantia nigra pars compacta and ventral
tegmental area (VTA) DA neurons are sensitive to the
expected time of reward (Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz,
2001;Hollerman&Schultz, 1998; Schultz,Dayan&Montague,
1997), and their temporal precision declines with interval
duration mimicking the decay of behavioral temporal pre-
cision (Fiorillo, Newsome,&Schultz, 2008). A central aspect
of our results is that the impact of DA blockade on temporal
preparation scaled with the level of external and internal
temporal uncertainties. Because temporal precision is likely
to be limited by internal and external sources of uncertainty,
DA blockade could have compromised the ability to
correctly keep track of time by deregulating the levels of
subjective temporal uncertainty (Frank, 2005). As a conse-
quence, temporal accuracy in estimating themean FPwould
also be corrupted.
However, the BG have no exclusive role in temporal
preparation; instead, they are part of a fronto-striatal loop
critical to temporal preparation (Dale et al., 2010; Vallesi,
McIntosh, Shallice, & Stuss, 2009; Matell & Meck, 2004).
Compelling evidence on the involvement of prefrontal
areas on keeping track of the passage of time comes from
human neuroimaging (Vallesi et al., 2009) and TMS stud-
ies as well as animal neurophysiology. Indeed, reversible
perturbation of human pFC with TMS can abolish the FP
effect (Vallesi, Shallice, & Walsh, 2007).
Similarly, prefrontal D1 depletion in rodents produced
weak FP effect, thus confirming the role of frontal DA circuits
in forming temporal representations (Parker et al., 2013). This
set of evidence supports the idea advanced by (Narayanan,
Land, Solder, Deisseroth, & Dileone, 2012) that temporal
preparation might rely on the orchestrated activity of VTA
neurons encoding the timing of rewards (Fiorillo et al.,
2008) and rodent prefrontal populations that encode the
passage of time (Narayanan & Laubach, 2006). These authors
showed that optogeneticmanipulationsofD1 signaling inVTA
projections to the pFC specifically influenced fixed-interval
timing performance. They further supported this view by
noting that their manipulation did not influence kinematic
parameters, consistent with previous work that investigated
these projections onmotor control (Narayanan et al., 2012).
In this study, we have observed a significant weakening
of the FP effect only under haloperidol. Given the differ-
ential affinity between haloperidol (D2/D1) and sulpiride
(D2), one could speculate that the inverted FP effect re-
ported in this study could have arisen by the additional
capacity of haloperidol to block prefrontal D1 receptors.
This would also be supported by the lack of effects exerted
by our manipulations on kinematic parameters of our
motor task, consistent with Narayanan’s results. However,
this explanation needs to be qualified with the observation
that the effect of sulpiride was not significant but never-
theless qualitatively similar to the haloperidol-mediated
effect. This difference might be produced by virtue of the
fact that haloperidol has greater receptor availability than
sulpiride simply by acting on more than one receptor type.
Furthermore, functional pathways mediated by D1 and D2
receptors, although possibly segregated, are not necessar-
ily independent (Calabresi, Picconi, Tozzi, Ghiglieri, & Di
Filippo, 2014). The weak effect of sulpiride on interval
timing has been previously linked to its affinity mainly with
D2 receptors in the mesolimbic DA system, whereas halo-
peridol also blocks D2 receptors in the nigrostriatal system
(Coull et al., 2011). Hence, one possible account for our
results is that haloperidol’s action on the nigrostriatal sys-
tem might have decreased the precision (and thus in-
creased the uncertainty) of interval timing, upon which
the formation of both temporal expectations and temporal
representations relies. Similar levels of subjective temporal
uncertainty introduced by haloperidol on temporal expec-
tations and representations (estimated by fitting subjective
hazard functions) corroborate this view.
Previously, the subjective hazard function has been
successfully employed to describe temporal preparation
(Tsunoda & Kakei, 2011; Bueti et al., 2010; Janssen &
Shadlen, 2005).However, here, wepropose that a canonical
implementation of the subjective hazard function, in which
f(t) (representing the component forming temporal expec-
tation across trials) and F(t) representing the compo-
nent updating the expectation within a trial) share the
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same Weber fraction, would fail to capture the relative
contributions of the processes underpinning temporal
preparation in variable timing tasks. On the contrary, when
f(t) and F(t) are treated as two separate components of the
same model, temporal preparation can be separated into
two components: one reflecting the temporal precision (or
uncertainty) ofmechanisms that form temporal expectations
between trials and another forming temporal representa-
tions within trials. This creates a conceptual bridge between
the mechanisms at the base of learning temporal context
and tracking the passage of time and, on the other hand,
a broad measure of temporal preparation such as RTs.
The combination of pharmacological interventions to-
gether with a model-based approach allows for the dissec-
tion of different processes involved in various forms of
timing and could provide a fruitful way to identify specific
mechanisms impaired in clinical conditions characterized
by altered timing. For example, because flattened FP effects
have been described in a subpopulation of Parkinsonian
patients (Jurkowski, Stepp, & Hackley, 2005; Bloxham
et al., 1987), characterized by pronounced frontal damage
(Coull et al., 2011), the prediction for ourmodel would be a
stronger reduction in temporal precision in the component
responsible for the updating of temporal representations.
In conclusion, we show for the first time that DA antag-
onist haloperidol impairs the ability to prepare move-
ments based on estimates about the most likely time of
occurrence of events. This impairment stems from the
inability to infer temporal structure from events across
trials together with the compromised capacity to keep
track of the passage of time within a trial, which prevents
the formation of precise temporal preparation. The det-
rimental effect of DA blockade on temporal preparation
increases with the level of both external and internal tem-
poral uncertainties and is accompanied with high levels
of subjective temporal uncertainty. This suggests that,
under DA blockade, the precision with which we process
time is inadequate to deal with high levels of temporal
uncertainty. Furthermore, it provides novel direct evi-
dence that DA regulates the precision with which we
process time when preparing for an action.
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